A Logical Model of Pluralistic Ignorance
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Much of the existing literature on pluralistic ignorance suggests that agents who find themselves in such a situation must consider themselves “special” in one way or another (Grosz 2018, Bjerring et al. 2014). Agents have to recognize their own dishonesty, but believe everyone around them is perfectly honest. This argument is taken to show that pluralistic ignorance is irrational. Modifying work from Christoff 2016, we use a simple logical model to show that these arguments for the irrationality of pluralistic ignorance depend on various introspection assumptions. We will finish by putting forth various scenarios where agents can be honest, headstrong, or something similar (generally taken to be impossible under pluralistic ignorance) but are nonetheless consistent if one relaxes introspection assumptions. This shows that agents can see themselves as no different from their friends and still be in a situation of pluralistic ignorance with sufficiently weak introspection assumptions.